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11.

Three statutory regimes at impasse:
Reverse payments in pay-for-delay
settlement agreements between
brand-name and generic drug
.
companies
Rudolph J .R. Peritz

Bayer AG recently paid $398 million to generic competitors in exchange
for their promise to stay off the market for Ciprofloxacin for the next six
years. 1Cipro, as it is called, is a widely used antibiotic. In these agreements
to settle patent infringement cases, Bayer made reverse payments - so
called because they were paid by the plaintiff patent holder to the accused
infringers. 2
There is outrage in the United States over these pay-for-delay agreements. President Obama's proposed budget declares that his 'administration will prevent drug companies from blocking generic drugs from
consumers by prohibiting anticompetitive agreements and collusion
between brand name and generic drug manufacturers intended to keep
generic drugs off the market.' 3 The most recent Bill to prohibit such
settlement agreements has recently been sent to the United States Senate
from the Judiciary Committee. 4 The public outrage and political responses
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1 In re Ciprofioxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 363 F Supp 2d 514
(EDNY 2005), affd, 544 F.3d. 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
2 Useful treatments of this subject include CS Hemphill, 'Paying for Delay'
(2006) 81 NYU L Rev 1553; C Shapiro, 'Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements'
(2003) 34 RandJ Econ 31; M O'Rourke and JF Brodley, 'An Incentives Approach to
Patent Settlements' (2003) 87 Minn L Rev 1767; M Carrier, 'Unsettling Drug Patent
Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive Illegality' (2009) 108 Mich L Rev 37.
3 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fy20 I O_key_healthcare/
(accessed
November 2009).
4 Reported in 'Senate Judiciary Committee Approves Bill Banning Reverse
Payment Agreements' (16 October 2009) Pat Tradem & Copyr J BNA Daily
Update #198.
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The decision effectively delayed market entry by generics producers,
who compete against brand name manufacturers not only on price but
also in litigation to challenge patent validity and scope. Moreover, FDA
procedures already required generics producers to go through a lengthy
and expensive approval process de novo even though their products were
chemically identical to brand-name drugs that had already been approved.
Combined with the Federal Circuit decision, the requirement of full FDA
re-testing effectively delayed competition by generics for years beyond the
patent period for brand-name drugs.
At the same time, the lengthy FDA approval process was also affecting
the branded companies whose research and development produced the
vast majority of new pharmaceuticals. Indeed, the industry claimed an
'innovation crisis' starting in the 1970s, when the number of new pharmaceuticals beginning human testing fell over 80 percent after Congress
amended the food and drug act to require the showing that drugs were
not only safe but also effective in their intended uses. The declared crisis in
pharmaceutical research and development was attributed to the increased
time needed for FDA approval and, with it, a steep decline in the patent's
effective life to seven years. 11
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Congress amended the food and drug act by passing the HatchWaxman Act of 1984, not only to open bottlenecks in the FDA approval
process but also to overturn the Federal Circuit decision that prohibited
unlicensed experimental use of patented drugs in preparation for seeking
FDA approval.
The legislation intended a balancing of policies to promote competition
by innovation by brand-name producers and to promote competition on
price by generic makers. Experience would show the statute was a flawed
attempt to promote both forms of competition in the pharmaceutical
industry.
Nonetheless, the effort was well-intended. One the one hand, the 1984 legislation addressed the brand name producers' declared 'innovation crisis' by
extending the drug patent term for as much as five years to take into account
the lengthy FDA approval process. 12 On average, the period of exclusivity
for drugs covered by valid patents would increase from 7 to 12 years.
On the other hand, Congress intended to hasten price competition by
generics in three important ways. First, Congress overturned the Federal
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Cf. Carrier, supra n. 2.
12 The amendment adds to the patent term half the time taken for clinical trials
plus the subsequent waiting period for FDA approval, up to a maximum of 14
additional years.
11
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month stays under the Hatch-Waxman Act make little sense in light of an
FTC study showing that pharmaceutical patent holders have lost almost
75 percent of patent infringement cases, despite the strong presumption
that requires accused infringers to prove patent invalidity by clear and
convincing evidence.16
It is not surprising, then, that drug patent holders pay generics - accused
infringers - to settle infringement cases that statistics suggest they are
likely to lose three times out of four. 17 The Hatch-Waxman Act was
passed on the assumption that generics and consumers have a common
interest in price competition. But the statute inadvertently changed the
game. Now branded and generic producers have the common interest:
the pay-for-delay provisions cost the branded companies far less than the
profits they would lose from price competition, while generic makers gain
far more than they would from competing on the market. In effect, it's the
consumer who pays.18
In my view, the food and drug act requires further amendment. First,
when a case is settled, the first filer's 180-day period of exclusivity should
revert to the next generics filer. Restoring this incentive to file would revive
the competitive pressure intended by Congress. Second, the automatic
30-month stay should be eliminated; instead, injunctive relief should
be available to the drug patent holder only under the same demanding
principles applied in other patent cases. Third, the reasons claimed for
patent invalidity or non-infringement in a generic filer's FDA confidential
application for early market entry should no longer be kept secret. Public
disclosure would have two likely benefits. First, free information about
a drug patent's infirmities and limitations would improve the conditions
for other generics to seek early entry. Second, the size of reverse payments
would decrease to the extent branded producers are paying for generics'
agreement to maintain secrecy.

It is in this context that federal courts have heard antitrust challenges
to the reverse payments in agreements settling patent infringement cases.
Both the Federal Trade Commission and private plaintiffs have filed
numerous lawsuits claiming that settlements with pay-for-delay provisions
violate the antitrust laws as agreements in restraint of trade or conspiracies
to monopolize.
The first appellate decision, handed down in 2003, concluded that the
19
agreement was 'a classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.'
The FTC has taken the more moderate position that these agreements are
.
.
presumptively illegal.2°
But all federal appeals courts since 2003 have rejected the views that
such agreements are per se or presumptively illegal unde~ Sh~r~an Act.§ I
and its FTC§ 5 equivalent. For example, the Eleventh Clrcmt m reversmg
the FTC applied a truncated rule of reason to conclude t?at the pa_Y-fordelay agreement was reasonable and thus legal. The pnmary rat10nale
given was that when the agreement stays within the scope of the patent, the
patent holder is merely exercising its statutory right to e~c.lude others ~rom
making, using, or selling the patented invention. Exerc1sm~ patent n?~ts
cannot be a violation of the antitrust laws. The court also relied on policies
in favor of settling lawsuits. 21
.
In the past few years, these two rationales - patents as exclus10nary
rights and settlements as deserving deference - have ~een. t~ken up .by the
2nd Circuit in New York and the powerful Federal Circmt m Washmgton
to conclude that such agreements are per se legal unless the patent is a sham
or the infringement case is entirely baseless. This standard has ~ profo~nd
impact that goes beyond the antitrust injury to con~umers, the h1gh~r pnces
for pharmaceuticals.22 It spills over into patent pohcy. The courts, m. refusing to consider the reasonableness of the agreement, ha~e .also put .aside ~he
question of patent viability. The 2nd Circuit stated exphc1tly that its pohcy
of favoring settlement is so strong that it extends to 'fatally weak' paten.ts,
'even though such settlements will inevitably pr?tec~ p~t.ent monopohes
that are, perhaps, undeserved.' This overwhelmmg Judicial deference to
case settlements, which are, after all, just privat.e contracts, creates t~~
perverse incentive to litigate and settle rather than mnovate and compete.
There are two recent class action suits brought by purchasers of
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16

h ttp://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07 /genericdrugstudy. pdf (accessed November
2009) at p. vi.
17 The settlement has a bonus for the paying patent holder: the patents remain
presumptively valid.
18
To make matters even worse, the Hatch-Waxman Act showed an unintended loophole that permitted the first filing generic to keep the 180-day period
of exclusivity even after settlement. As a result, all other generics were blocked
from entering the market until 180 days after the first filer's delayed entry - years
later, if at all. And so the brand name drug-maker had another valuable reason
to settle. Congress did pass an amendment in 2003 that narrowed the loop hole
prospectively. The first filer would now forfeit the exclusivity bonus if it failed to
market its generic drug within 75 days of FDA approval or of an appellate court
determination that the patent is invalid or not infringed.

In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
See supra n. 15.
.
21
Schering-Plough Corp. v FTC, 402 F.3? 1056 ~I.Ith Ctr. 2006).
.
22 In re Ciprofioxacin Hydrochloride A.n'.tlrust L111g., 544 F.3d .1323 (Fed. Ctr.
2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust L1t1g., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Ctr. 2006).
23 In re Tamoxifen litigation, 466 F.3d at 211.
19
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Cipro, the subject matter of Bayer's $398 million reverse payment that
I mentioned to open the chapter. In one, the Supreme Court refused to
review the Federal Circuit's determination of per se legality 24 even though
54 law, economics, and business scholars filed an amicus brief urging
the Court to overturn the decision. In the other Cipro class action, the
2nd Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision approving the settlement
agreement. Many thought the Court would take a more skeptical attitude toward the agreement and depart from precedent because the Court
prior to oral argument addressed an extraordinary letter to the Solicitor
General of the United States inviting 'the Executive Branch to address the
question.' 25 The invitation is highly unusual if not unprecedented in its
acknowledgement of criticism - here by the Solicitor General that the 2nd
Circuit's influential opinion in its prior reverse payments case was 'incorrect.' An open letter from ten large consumer rights organizations urges
the government to accept the invitation and confute the view that these
settlement agreements are legal under the antitrust laws. 26
The 54 scholars' amicus brief urged the United States Supreme Court
to reject the view of per se legality, arguing that the public policy in favor
of settlement does not merit such weight. In_ light of the 73 percent failure
rate of pharmaceutical patents in cases actually litigated, there is a more
powerful public interest in invalidating weak patents, stopping unearned
monopoly profits, and bringing to a halt the perverse incentives produced
by these reverse payments.
Indeed, it was five years ago that the Supreme Court affirmed the doctrine that patents do not grant antitrust immunity. 27 Moreover, there is
longstanding Supreme Court precedent that IP licensing cannot provide
a pretext for agreements in restraint of trade. 28 The Second and Federal

24
Arkansas Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v Bayer AG, 129 S Ct 2828
(2009).
25
Arkansas Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v Bayer AG, 2d Cir., No.
05-2851-cv(L), reported in (BNA 1 September 2010) 80 Patent, Tradem & Copyr J
636. Letter re: In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation to the Office
of the Solicitor General of the United States from Clerk of the Court, on behalf of
a three-judge panel for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
dated 6 April 2009.
26
Letter re: Need for the Administration's Views in Pharmaceutical 'Exclusion
Payments' cases written on Behalf of [10 named consumer rights organizations]
to United States Attorney General Eric H Holder, Jr, US Department of Justice,
dated 17 April 2009, on file with the author.
27 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v Independent Ink, Inc., 547 US 28 (2006).
28
Palmer v BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 US 46 (1990) (finding per se illegal copyright
licensing agreement as pretext for territorial market allocation).
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Circuits thus seem to have got it wrong in declaring that every patent
holder has an absolute right to prevent competition within the 'exclusionary zone' of all patents, including the many that are weak. This approach
takes the rebuttable status of patent validity and treats it as irrebuttable,
even though the Supreme Court has long characterized a patent as something closer to a probable property right. 29 Moreover, it seems pretty clear
that the generics' promises to delay entry are in consideration for the large
reverse payments, not in concern for the restraining effects attributable to
weak patents.
So, what is the prognosis? If the Supreme Court had granted the petition in the Federal Circuit's Cipro case to resolve the conflict in the circuit
courts, the outcome would have been in deep doubt, in my view. Why?
Because there are two powerful policies that collide, two policies each
of which the Court has supported independently. For one, there is the
strong support for property rights, especially intellectual property rights.
And so the Court is inclined to find as reasonable an agreement whose
restraints fall within the so-called 'exclusionary zone' of the patent. The
second policy is procedural rather than substantive. In recent years, the
Supreme Court has moved away from clear rules and toward balancing
tests in both antitrust and patent cases. Per se rules have given way to
more fact-intensive inquiries. In patent cases, for example, the Supreme
Court has rejected bright line rules fashioned by the Federal Circuit for
injunctions, prosecution history estoppel, and prior art reference materials
to determine non-obviousness. 30 In antitrust, the Court's rejection of the
century-old doctrine that resale price maintenance is per se illegal is only
the most recent example of a shift toward the rule of reason. 31
Does this shift make sense? In theory, a rule of reason calls for a flexible
approach intended to take into account the particular commercial circumstances. And that's good. But, in practical terms, a rule of reason analysis

29

A patent represents a 'legal conclusion by the Patent Office, ... often ex
parte, ... on factors as to which reasonable men can differ widely. Consequently, it
does not seem to us to be unfair to require a patentee to defend the Patent Office's
judgment ... ' Lear, Inc. v Adkins, 395 US 653, 670 (1969).
30
See, e.g. eBay (more flexible approach to injunctive remedy), supra note. 15;
KSR Int'!. Co. v Teleflex Inc., 127 S Ct 1727, 1742 (2007) (less rigid approach to
determining prior art for nonobviousness inquiry; Festa Corp. v Shoketsu Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., Inc., 535 US 722 (2002) (more open approach to determining extent
of prosecution history estoppel).
31
See, e.g. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v PSKS, Inc., 551 US 877
(2007) (applying rule of reason to minimum resale price maintenance); State Oil
Co. v Khan, 522 US 3 (1997) (applying rule of reason to maximum resale price
maintenance).
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in antitrust amounts to de facto legality because it produces high cost and
high risk cases, which deters litigation. This closing of the court house
door in my view is inconsistent with the longstanding US policy favoring
and, indeed, depending on private plaintiffs, often small firms and consumers unable to afford the expensive litigation of rule of reason cases;
moreover, the standards for class action suits have become exceedingly
difficult to attain. And so I am disinclined from a full-blown rule of reason.
The best solution in the antitrust cases, in my view, would be adoption
of the FTC's approach of presumptive illegality, which would shift some
cost and risk to the brand-name manufacturer and, as a result, improve
conditions for generics to challenge weak patents and compete on price.
Moreover, the approach would mitigate the perverse incentives that result
from shielding weak patents from scrutiny. Indeed, a strong presumption
of illegality would reflect judicial experience, in particular the 73 percent
failure rate in cases litigated to date. Finally, the FTC would become an
even more forceful arbiter of these settlement agreements.
Together with amendments to fix the food and drug act, what would
be the result of an antitrust analysis that begins with a strong presumption that reverse payments in pay-for-delay settlements are illegal? The
market for pharmaceuticals would sooner become price competitive, weak
drug patents would be more open to challenge, and as a result consumers would save billions of dollars annually without taking from branded
drug companies legitimately earned incentives to engage in research and
development.

12.

Patent ambush and reverse
payments: Comments
Gustavo Ghidini

My comments are very short and address both topics jointly. I believe
that, in the case of both reverse payment and patent ambush, antitrust
enforcement should not take into consideration, as arguments for defence,
the questions of validity and/or scope of the patent concerned, or the
degree of market power it may embody or has come to embody.
In either case, indeed, on the one hand, the competitor's behaviour is
not based, in a proper sense, on the exercise of her/his statutory patent
rights (see below). On the other hand, symmetrically, the rationale of
antitrust enforcement rests on different and independent legal grounds, not
essentially influenced by 'strictly IP' questions. Of course, patents come
into play, but in relation to the factual, rather than the legal, framework.
Take, for example, the issue of reverse payments: what has this practice
to do, in a proper sense, with the exploitation of patent rights? Patent
rights allow the exclusion of free riders, and not of lawful entries. In
other words, contractual exclusion is not a legal exercise of patent rights.
Therefore, a pay-for-delay settlement is just a straightj(nward horizontal
agreement in restraint of competition, which would be equally illicit - this
is a counterproof of my assumption - even if no patent existed. Wouldn't
pay-for-delay settlements violate antitrust rules even if they took place
between two producers of generics? As Abbott and Michel of the FTC
have convincingly argued in 2006, 1 'the payment and not the patent
provides exclusion resulting from the agreement'.
Analogously in patent ambush cases: here, thanks to his fraudulent

1 AF Abbot and ST Michel, 'The right balance of competition policy and
intellectual property law: a perspective on settlement of pharmaceutical patent litigation' (2005) 46 IDEA 1, also available at: http://nessiteras.piercelaw.edu/assets/
pdf/idea-vol46-nol-abbott-michel.pdf (accessed December 2010). Mr Abbott
was Associate Director, and Ms Michel Chief Counsel at the Federal Trade
Commission. See also In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896 (6th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 US 939 (2004).
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